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Dobron v. Bunch, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 36 (Sept 10, 2009) 1
CONTRACT LAW – GUARANTY AGREEMENTS
Summary
An appeal from an Eighth Judicial District Court award of attorney fees stemming from a
guaranty agreement.
Disposition/Outcome
District Court’s award reversed because a lender is not entitled to attorney fees for
actions unrelated to the collection or compromise of loans.
Factual and Procedural History
Del Bunch Jr. (“Bunch”) loaned money to companies owned by Thomas Dobron
(“Dobron”). As part of the loan agreements, Dobron signed a guaranty note in which he
promised to personally repay the loans if the companies failed to do so. Dobron also agreed to
pay Bunch’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred “in collecting or compromising any such
indebtedness.”
Shortly thereafter, the Dobron companies filed a usury action in California against
Bunch, claiming the interest rate of the loans was usurious and illegal. After removal to Nevada
and a series of appeals, Bunch successfully defended the charges.
About a year later, Bunch filed suit in Nevada against Dobron in an effort to recover the
fees and costs accumulated by defending the usury law suit. The district court found for
Bunches and Dobron appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. On appeal, the Court held that
attorneys’ fees were potentially recoverable if the district court specifically found that the
particular guaranty agreement between Dobron and Bunch provided for attorneys’ fees. Because
this issue was not decided previously, the Court remanded the case back to the district court.
The district court then held that Bunch was entitled to attorneys’ fees because the defense of the
usury action directly affected Bunch’s ability to collect on the loans and fell within the terms of
the guaranty agreement. Dobron appealed once again to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Discussion
Standard of Review
The Nevada Supreme Court reviews contract interpretation de novo. 2 Prior to this
opinion, the Court strictly construed the obligation of guarantors unless the surety was
compensated. 3 In rejecting this “unclear, mechanical approach,” the Court went on to adopt
general contract interpretation methods in cases involving guaranty agreements. Consistent with
ordinary contract interpretation, the Court will not construe a provision for attorneys’ fees
beyond the express terms of an agreement.
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Terms of the contract before the Court
The Court held that defending a charge of usury does not fall within the meaning of
“collect[ing] or compromis[ing] loans.” Although usury laws may potentially reduce the amount
of interest collected on a loan, the Court reasoned that this type of reasoning unacceptably
strained the plain language of the contract between Dobron and Bunch.
Authority supporting the Court’s rationale
In a similar precedent case, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a real property owner is
not liable for attorney fees that a real estate agent accrues defending an action for indemnity. 4
Because the indemnity related to declaratory relief, instead of the underlying contract for the real
estate listing, the Court held that the fees were not recoverable. 5
After comparing Campbell and the case at bar, the Court cited with approval other
jurisdictions decisions that narrowly construed attorneys’ fees. 6 Lastly, the Court discussed in
detail the Illinois case, Zimmerman v. First Production Credit Association. 7 There, the issue was
whether a declaratory relief action to invalidate a note is sufficiently related to loan collection. 8
In its holding, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the validity of the note may indeed affect the
ability of a lender to collect, but potential impact is not enough to show an affirmative link to
collection of the debt. 9 By applying Zimmerman’s rationale to the Dobron contract, the Court
held that the potential impact of the usury action on the lender’s ability to collect was not enough
to receive attorney’s fees pursuant to the contract.
Lack of involvement by Dobron
The Court lastly held that Dobron personally did not stand to benefit and potentially
could have been harmed by the usury proceedings made by the companies. Because Dobron was
liable for payment of the loans only in the event of default, it would be wrong to argue his
obligation to pay for the attorney’s fees.
Concurring Opinion (Pickering, J.)
Justice Pickering wrote separately to emphasize that recovery of attorneys’ fees depends
on the particular contract clause involved. Although she did agree with the outcome in this
particular case, the Justice noted that Nevada law allows one sided attorney’s fees 10 and that a
party may agree to charges and fees as they choose within a contract. 11
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Conclusion
Because the Court limits attorney’s fees to those specifically agreed to in a contract, a
guarantor is not liable for fees incurred for reasons other than collecting or compromising the
loan. Accordingly, the Court concluded that because the usury action did not constitute a
recovery action by the Bunches, Dobron was not liable for the Bunches’ attorney’s fees in
defending the usury action. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court.

